Iraqis
left physically unharmed by violence may still have an economic price to pay.
Iraq witnessed
its bloodiest month in June since the height of its civil war in the summer of
2007. Preliminary data show that almost 2,000 civilians have died as violence
gripped the country. The figure would rise significantly if casualties from the
Iraqi security forces were also included. Not only does increased violence
threaten the physical safety of Iraqis, it also adversely impacts the economic
well-being of those fortunate enough to survive unharmed.
Data on casualties
from violence in Iraq come from two main sources. The United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) publishes statistics on civilian and security forces
casualties based on witness reports as well as evidence from civil leaders,
government officials, international organisation, media reports and the UNAMI
own network in Iraq. The
figures released by UNAMI show that 1,531 civilians and 886 members of the
Iraqi Security Forces were killed in June. These numbers exclude deaths in the
Anbar province, where the UNAMI estimates further 244 civilian deaths. The
figures make June comfortably the bloodiest month since UNAMI started publishing
its statistics in January 2008.
The second source
is Iraq Body Count, a project to
record civilian casualties in Iraq since 2003 based mainly on verifiable media
reports. Its preliminary estimate for civilian casualties in June stands at
1,934—the highest number since August 2007, or the heydays of the civil war.
The data also show that 2014 is on track to become the most violent year
outside 2005-7.
What does that
imply about growth in 2014? If the levels of violence seen in the first half of
2014 were to continue into the second half of the year, 2014 would be the most
violent year outside the 2005-7 period. Should the impact of violence on the
economy be similar to the one witnessed in recent years, then we should expect real GDP growth of 4.4%.
Alternatively, a
more tragic scenario in which the elevated levels of violence in June continued
for the rest of the year would result in 18.5 thousand civilian deaths, making
2014 the third most violent year after 2006-7, the peak of the civil war. Under
this scenario, real GDP would grow by a mere 3.1%. Given that population is also
expected to grow by 3.1%, this would imply stagnant economic conditions for the
average Iraqi.
So what are the
economic costs of increased violence? The International Monetary Fund had
recently forecast real GDP growth of 5.9% in 2014, the recent rise in violence
would probably shave off 1.5-2.8% from this year’s real GDP—a significant cost
for a country still lagging behind in terms of goods and services provided.
It means that
Iraqis who were fortunate enough not to lose their lives or get injured during
the recent violence may still have an economic price to pay.
Good to see your blog is back, albeit on a grim note. Given major distortions caused by the oil sector, much of which is somewhat insulated against violence, might be useful to looking at relations between violence levels and non-oil GDP or specific sectors.
ReplyDeleteThank you for your comment, Justin. The relationship between non-oil GDP and violence is similar the chart in the post but less pronounced. I am also not sure that the oil sector is completely insulated from violence. More violence, even in other parts of Iraq, increases the risk of terrorism and sabotage. And as reported in the link below, it leads international oil companies to withdraw their staff from Iraq. If anything, growth in the oil sector seems more sensitive to violence than other sectors.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.cnbc.com/id/101762384